Penrose On Whether A Platonic Objectivity Can Exist Independent of Human Minds.

I have been rereading certain sections of The Road To Reality by the famous mathematical physicist Roger Penrose as he touches on many things near and dear to my heart.  One of these things is whether there is a real existence of objective truth independent of human minds. Penrose seems to argue such objective frameworks probably do exist and uses math as an example. He also admits by analogous reasoning one may argue an objective morality or aesthetics beyond the minds of men may also exist but in this book he is only concerned with the math. Now to quote Penrose:

Platonic existence, as I see it, refers to the existence of an objective external standard that is not dependent upon our individual opinions nor upon our particular culture. Such 'existence' could also refer to things other than mathematics, such as to morality or aesthetics, but I am here concerned just with mathematical objectivity, which seems to be a much clearer issue...

Plato himself would have insisted that there are two other fundamental absolute ideals, namely that of the Beautiful and that of the Good. I am not at all adverse to admitting the existence of such ideals, and to allowing the Platonic world to be extended so as to contain absolutes of this nature.

And now for his reasoning about math.  Though he can't prove it, he seems to believe that belief in a real objective mathematics independent of man is necessary in order to trust it and make progress. And because the robustness of math transcends the notorious untrustworthiness of human minds, it seems to have a reality that goes beyond it's creation coming from the minds of men:

Yet, there is something important to be gained in regarding mathematical structures as having a reality of their own. For our individual minds are notoriously imprecise, unreliable, and inconsistent in their judgements. The precision, reliability,  and consistency that are required by our scientific theories demand something beyond any one of our individual (untrustworthy) minds. In mathematics, we find a far greater robustness than can be located in any particular mind. Does this not point to something outside ourselves, with a reality that lies beyond what each individual can achieve?...

He then says a typical critique is that math is just a product of human minds but has these amazing properties because it has been distilled down over years to those human ideas that can consistently be shown to be true by all. He then says this line of reasoning is circular because for everyone to agree that something is right requires an external standard. (Leading us back to an external objective existence.) He then says:

Mathematics itself indeed seems to have a robustness that goes far beyond what any individual mathematician is capable of perceiving. Those who work in this subject, whether they are actively engaged in mathematical research or just using results that have been obtained by others, usually feel that they are merely explorers in a world that lies far beyond themselves--a world which possesses an objectivity that transcends mere opinion, be that opinion their own or the surmise of others, no matter how expert those others might be.

He then decides to illustrate how we might expect history to be different if math was subjective. Fermat's last theorem was proposed as being true 350 years before it was proven. If the theorem was subjective and culturally relativistic, then over 350 years with so many cultures contemplating the idea, surely a counterexample may have been constructed. Back to Penrose:

Let me illustrate this issue by considering one famous example of a mathematical truth, and relate it to the question of 'objectivity'. In 1637, Pierre de Fermat made his famous assertion now known as 'Fermat's Last Theorem.'... Fermat's mathematical assertion remained unconfirmed for over 350 years, despite concerted efforts by numerous outstanding mathematicians. A proof was finally published in 1995...

Now, do we take the view that Fermat's assertion was always true, long before Fermat actually made it, or is its validity a purely cultural matter, dependent upon whatever might be the subjective standards of the community of human mathematicians? Let us try to suppose that the validity of the Fermat assertion is in fact a subjective matter. Then it would not be an absurdity for some other mathematician X to have come up with an actual and specific counter-example to the Fermat assertion, so long as X had done this before the date of 1995...

I think that virtually all mathematicians, irrespective of their professed attitudes to 'Platonism', would regard such possibilities as patently absurd.

In conclusion: Just because humans discovered something, like math, doesn't mean they invented its  objective reality. Belief in such an objective existence independent of the minds of men leads one to be able to "feel that they are merely explorers in a world that lies far beyond themselves--a world which possesses an objectivity that transcends mere opinion." A world, as Penrose describes later, that seems to transcend time and this mortal sphere as it seems to be vastly larger then what is needed to describe this physical world and in fact would be largely unknown if we tried to limit math to that which does seem applicable to this mortal sphere. And as Penrose alludes to in the first quote, if the existence of an objective mathematics beyond the minds of men actually exists, what what other such objective frameworks my exist in reality?  I will let the readers decide for themselves but the possibility of exploring such timeless and objective "worlds that [lie] beyond ourselves" to me is fascinating.

Playing with Ngram: Noticing Philosophical Trends

The other day I was playing around with Google's Ngram, which uses the books in Google Books to track the change in the use or popularity of different words or terms over time (basically how often a word or phrase appears in published works). Just out of curiosity I put in 'Plato' and 'Aristotle' to see how popular they have been over the years. The resulting graph was surprisingly interesting (you may have to click on the graph to see it).

Here Plato is in red and Aristotle is in blue. There are a few interesting things here. Before about 1790 Aristotle is hardly mentioned at all until his precipitous climb to popularity. I immediately wondered if this was an effect of the books they were using or if writers really didn't talk about Aristotle before the 1790's. Perhaps they referred to him by a different name, I know Thomas Aquinas simply called him "The Philosopher" (any insights from those readers who have more than a BS degree in Philosophy?). Maybe the English just didn't talk about him. But after about 1805 the two are almost inseparable, until about 1865 where Plato just seems to go off and have a party by himself, and Aristotle just tags along. They come back together around the end of WWI (this sounds like a bad soap opera), but then in 1960 Aristotle has his thing and Plato has never caught back up.

I also noticed that there was a striking drop in the popularity of both philosophers starting in about 1965 (with a strong revival 20 years later). I wondered if this effect could be seen in other philosophers. Behold the result:

Here I have included Aquinas, Aristotle, Plato, Nietzsche, Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein. David Hume died in 1776 (and we became a free country, coincidence? I think not! Definitely some causation there...sorry philosophy joke), so he was talked about even before he died. Kant died in 1804, but interest in in his stuff only slowly picked up until his first big peak in the 1880's. Nietzsche died in 1900, and had his first big showing during WWI. Wittgenstein died in 1951, which is when he started to get talked about (Lesson for today: If you want people to talk about you just have to die.).

I noticed that the decline of the 1960's was present in all philosophers except Nietzsche who had his second big bump (Wittgenstein did not drop but his upward progress was slowed). So now the big question, is this just an effect of how Google gets and processes the data, or did people really stop talking about all those philosophers in the 1960's? And what drove the revival in the late 80's and throughout the 90's, and now why have they all dropped off, including Nietzsche? Also, it seems that the period between 1860 and 1920 was more Platonic but since 1960 we have been more focused on Aristotle (Atlas Shrugged was published in 1957, which is almost exactly when Aristotle and Plato diverge. Coincidence? Probably not. And that is not a joke.). What effect has that had on us? A whole host of interesting questions.

Scientific Consensus And/Or Turing Completeness?

(Below isn't the most correct use of Turing Complete but you get my point...)

Today I was reading Not Even Wrong who quotes Susskind on the Multiverse:

In 1974 I had an interesting experience about how scientific consensus forms. People were working on the as yet untested theory of hadrons [subatomic particles such as protons and neutrons], which is called quantum chromodynamics, or QCD. At a physics conference I asked, “You people, I want to know your belief about the probability that QCD is the right theory of hadrons.” I took a poll. Nobody gave it more than 5 percent. Then I asked, “What are you working on?” QCD, QCD, QCD. They were all working on QCD. The consensus was formed, but for some odd reason, people wanted to show their skeptical side. They wanted to be hard-nosed. There’s an element of the same thing around the multiverse idea. A lot of physicists don’t want to simply fess up and say, “Look, we don’t know any other alternative.

This then got me thinking along the lines of being "Turing Complete".  As many of you may know, if you want to solve a problem that can be solved algorithmically, any Turing Complete framework will do the job.

Now back to Susskind's quote.  He implies that people mostly didn't believe in QCD at first, but since everybody was working on it eventually it found the most success in physics.  Did QCD become successful because it is really *the* correct version of what is going on in particle physics or is it because it was the most worked on framework and so ultimately was cleverly engineered to model reality?

Now, QCD makes successful predictions and so it is more than a framework, it is a successful scientific theory.  However, part of me wonders if the physics community used a completely different approach to particle physics and if everyone worked on that alternative approach if eventually they would have found a completely different framework that not only explains particle physics but successfully makes predictions.

So how much of current physical theories are *exact* and *unique* versus how many have a "Turing Completeness" about them such that if the whole community works on them for decades, eventually they both fit the data and make successfully predictions?

So this becomes my question: Are the main theories in physics accepted because they are the unique theories that fit the data and make predictions or are they accepted because the community adopted them early on and cleverly molded them into models that fit the data and eventually make successful predictions?  If the later, are these theories really unique?  Is there a "Turing Complete" set of frameworks that can always describe the same underlying physics and coincidentally make successful predictions making them valid scientific thoeries?

And if this is all a set of "Turing Complete" frameworks, where one framework is favored by the community, can we ever know what is really happening versus what we have forced to work?

Thoughts?

Deconstructed Philosophy

I came across an interesting opinion piece today and I found this quote particularly interesting (and it should be interesting to those who are wondering why nobody seems to listen to philosophers any more).

"Philosophy, it seems to me, has spoked its own wheel in its hyper-late-post-modern deconstruction that somehow deconstructed itself. It broke down in such a way that the philosopher is now so divorced from real life and sucked into a simulated one (modelled) that often he has nothing constructive to say on current events."

I think that that right there sums up what is wrong with philosophy, it has distanced itself so far from real life and current events that it is no longer applicable. I think, quite seriously, that the reason why philosophers (collectively, not individually) are no longer taken seriously is because they collectively stopped answering questions. Anyone who had to suffer through David "The billiard ball did not cause the other to move" Hume, Søren "Believe against all reason" Kierkegaard, Friedrich "There is no free-will" Nietzsche and Peter "I actually have a very good argument if you will listen to me because if you think about it long enough I'm sure that my ideas will convince you that your natural inclinations of morality and basic human needs and desires are all wrong and misguided and supremely immoral because when you consider the utility it makes sense when you weigh the interests of others against your own inclinations then it makes perfect sense it's just that the details are a little fuzzy" Singer will understand.

What it comes down to is that the field of study known as philosophy stopped offering answers or solutions to practical problems, and got caught up in arguing about trivial things (such as trying to prove that we don't exist). The reason why this happened is because there was another outlet, namely science (mostly physics) where people could turn for answers. For example, in the case of billiard balls, Hume's response was "we can't tell if one billiard ball caused the other to move". Newton's response, on the other hand, was "p_i = p_f --> p_1i = p_1f + p_2f". Well that may be slightly incomprehensible so some people, but at least it was an answer, and furthermore Newton could go on to explain about the sun and the moon and the stars and the planets and things falling and things flying through the air and light and a lot of other cool things. If you go ask a philosopher about that stuff they will probably say, "Well we can't actually see anything, and you really aren't talking to me." It's no wonder people stopped listening to philosophers.

Until this problem is fixed in philosophy you will never read a news story that quotes a philosopher (think about it, how many news stories are there that contain the phrase "Dr. So-and-So, a noted scientist/physicist/astronomer/biologist/chemist/sociologist said...", but how many have quotes from a "noted philosopher"?). This is because when news people (or people in general) want an answer to a question they go ask a scientist, never a philosopher. I can't count the number of times I met someone who found out that I study physics and they instantly say "Can I ask you about ...?", but I never have anyone say that when the find out that I also study philosophy. Mostly they just look at me funny.

Now I do realize that a lot of professional philosophers do do important work, and there are several of my former professors that I have tremendous respect for, but until philosophy in general stops arguing that there is no truth and there are no answers and is capable of providing real world applications to what they are talking about (i.e. solving real problems), then it will forever remain deconstructed and broken.

[PS: I know that there are some philosophers out there who are trying to fix this, but unfortunately there are not enough of them. There are some indications that this is changing, but it may take a while until you regularly have quotes from "noted philosophers" in news stories.]

Who Is John Galt?

Given I know that some of our readers and authors are fans of Ayn Rand in some way or another, (I personally haven't read any of her books) I thought I would post a trailer of a movie based on Atlas Shrugged.  I guess this movie will not be playing everywhere (but will be here in Irvine since the Ayn Rand Institute is here) so if you want to see it you may have to be proactive.  A list of locations the movie will be shown is here.

So if you are an Ayn Rand fan: enjoy!  And if you stick around maybe you will be lucky someone will write another post on objectivism.  We have enjoyed some of those in the past.

Conway's Game of Life, God, Science, and "The Lawgiver".

This is not going to be a rigorous scientific post. (Sorry about that) But it is in response to my fellow scientists who keep trying to prove to me things like Dr. Conway's Game of Life implies God isn't needed.   Or the line of reasoning of Sean Carroll which states that if the laws of the universe are able to explain everything we observe, the intelligent thing to do is to get rid of God.  My conclusion is that such scientists are falling victim to issues discussed here plus more I discuss below.

Now, I'm not going to try and prove God is exists, but only show that Conway's Game of Life may actually demonstrate the opposite of what atheists are hoping for.

Watch the video above.  Dr. Conway decided to see if diverse complexity can arise from simple rules.  He decides to program a computer game with simple rules and see what pops out.  Interestingly, he gets exactly what he was hoping for: complex creatures that appear lifelike.  (Watch the video).

To the game: So let's assume it took Dr. Conway ~6 days to come up with his simple set of laws, and on the seventh he rested from his rule making labors and decided to now let the game run and do it's thing.  :)   This is what would happen:

1. As more and more time goes by, more and more complex creatures would form.
2. Some creatures may become so complex they exhibit intelligence.
3. Some of these intelligent creatures may be so intelligent they realize that through science they can uncover what all the laws of the universe must be.
4. Some creatures may develop further hubris and claim: "Through science we can discover all the laws, and from these laws the universe and all its complexity we observe can be sufficiently explained by the laws alone.  And therefore, it is pointless to think an external sentient being was needed because the laws are good enough, and the only creatures that think an external sentient being is needed are deluded, brainwashed weak-minded creatures.  I mean, we can measure the laws, and know they are real, and they can explain everything we observe so a belief in an external sentient being is both unneeded and absurd!"
5. And yet others may conclude that the elegance and rationality of the laws may hint at a sentient source.  They might say: "I admit science is awesome and has helped us uncover all the laws one by one and the laws are really magnificent and can form galaxies, create complexity, etc... on their own.  True.  But shouldn't the existence of such rational and magnificent laws imply a rational and magnificent lawgiver?"
6.  I'm sure there are other conclusions to be drawn but I will stick to #4 and #5. (You can come up with your own conclusions in the comments.)

In this case, #5 would have to base their belief solely on faith and aesthetics but the interesting thing is (in this case) #5 are the creatures that are correct!

Conclusion: None of this proves God exists!  That's not my intent. But I hope this shows two things:

1. Just because the laws we uncover with science can explain everything observed, and therefore are "good enough" in this sense, does not imply a sentient lawgiver is an unintelligent thing to believe in.  In fact, in the very example the atheists use when discussing Conway's Game of Life, a sentient lawgiver is the correct conclusion.
2. The fact that there are such laws in our own universe: rational, elegant and having the richness to create all of the magnificent complexity we see should allow us to wonder (without too much ridicule): Could such laws really exist without a Lawgiver with similar qualities: rationality, elegance Who through small and simple means (simple laws) bring about great things (complexity)?  Do the laws really just coincidentally exist this way (end of story) or are we allowed to think that perhaps there is more?  

Anyways, I am not going to sit here and say atheists are obviously wrong.   I admit living in such a Dr. Conway world, #4 may seem like a very tempting conclusion.  However, I also think that people who ridicule the #5 creatures walking the earth today are very pre-mature and presumptuous in their ridicule.  (In Dr. Conway's world, the #5 creature are right!)

So, I think there are intelligent reasons to believe the elegant and rational nature of the laws, that I and my scientist colleagues uncover each day, in fact hint at a very elegant and rational source.  

Everyday Philosophy: Epistemological Realism vs. Epistemological Idealism

Due to some of the comments on a previous post I thought I could help lay a foundation for discussion by giving a crash course in everyday philosophy (kind of like a crash course in everyday physics, but for ideas instead of physics). The actual debate is much more complex, but for our purposes we can use the simplified form of the debate. This might be a little long, but bear with me. To understand some of what I am talking about it may be necessary to read the post and comments that prompted this post. It may be a bit of a read, but it may make reading this a little easier to understand what I am talking about.

Part of the reason why the previous post elicited so many comments was that it, unintentionally, hit on a major philosophical debate, that of the distinction between epistemological realism and epistemological idealism, which has also been classed as a difference between objectivism and subjectivism, and is related to the debate between empiricism and rationalism.

First I will explain what I mean by 'epistemological'. Epistemology is the study of how we know things. That's it, very simple. So 'epistemological' indicates a way in which we know something, either through realism or idealism. Now I will explain the difference between, and related ideas of, epistemological realism and epistemological idealism. After that I will discuss why the distinction is important and how it comes up in everyday conversations using examples from the comments in the previously mentioned post.

In the simplest sense epistemological realism is the idea that observable characteristics exist in the observed object, independent of the observer. Likewise epistemological idealism is the idea that the characteristics exist in the mind of the observer independent of the object. So why is this difference important and where does it come up?

You may have heard (haha) the example of "If a tree falls in a forest does it make a sound?" Someone who is a strict epistemological idealist will say, no, because no one is there to observe the tree falling to interpret what happened as making a sound and thus it cannot create a "sound". But someone who is a strict epistemological realist will say, yes, because sound is just pressure waves in the air and there does not have to be an observer in order to make a "sound". The reason why this simple example presents a problem to many people is because they are not strict realists or strict idealists. Because they personally have a mixture of views they usually settle on the conclusion, "Well it depends." or "I can see how it could be either way." or "Stop bothering me with stupid questions." (as a side note, the people who respond, "It depends on what you are talking about. If you when you say "sound" you mean the mental process that recognizes it as such, then no there was no sound. But if you mean pressure waves in the air when you say "sound" then, yes there was a sound made." The people that respond like this are called Pragmatists.) But a strict realist or a strict idealist will give a definitive yes or no answer to the question (I am, for the most part, a strict realist, with a tempering of pragmatism, as are many scientists. I will discuss this further down.).

Furthermore, epistemological realism, also called objectivism (not to be confused with Objectivism, which is the philosophy taught by Ayn Rand, though they are definitely related), is dominated by two schools of thought, that of Platonic objectivism (other wise known as the Theory of Forms) and Aristotelian objectivism (of which Ayn Rand's Objectivism is a modern adaptation of). Platonic objectivism assumes that the highest form of reality is that of the Forms, which cannot be accessed through our senses, but only through reason and rational thought. Thus objective reality is grounded in our rational thoughts. This way of thinking (or the objections to it) has dominated Western Philosophy and has been the basis of the philosophical systems of St. Augustine, Descartes, Kant and many more philosophers. This dominance has been so complete that it prompted Alfred North Whitehead to say,

The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them.

This dominance of Platonic thought worked its way into Christianity through St. Augustine, who explicitly stated that in matters where the Bible was silent, an appeal to philosophers (Plato) could be used. This union is generally referred to as the Hellenization of Christianity. This brought many of the Platonic ideas of God into Christianity, including things like God has neither body, parts nor passions, among many other ideas regarding the omnipotence and omniscience of God.

To recap, the major distinctions here include epistemological idealism, which holds that any characteristics that can be known of an object exist only in the mind of the observer. Epistemological realism holds that what is knowable exists in the thing being observed and is independent of the observer. Epistemological realism can roughly be sub-divided into two categories, namely Platonic rationalism and Aristotelian empiricism, the former being that the objective reality can only be accessed by the mind, but it is still objective, and that what is learned by the senses is dependent on the rational thought of the observer. The latter holds that the senses have primacy in determining the objectivity of reality, with our rational thoughts being subject to our experience.

The question is now, is there an application beyond simple (or silly) philosophical brain teasers and esoteric debates between old dead guys? Yes! there is. As it turns out, these very ideas are what prompted Nick's post and the string of comments afterwards. Let us take a look at some of the comments and find out what ideas are kinking around. Keep in mind that it is very rare for one person to be a strict realist (meaning they only express realist ideas) or a strict idealist. Usually people express some combination of the two. A number of people are idealists when it comes to God (both believers and atheists alike) but are strict realists when they have to go to the store and buy milk. Also as a note, science is strongly in the camp of epistemological realism, with a mixture of Platonic rationalism and Aristotelian empiricism, though usually with a strong emphasis on the empiricism.

First, "advocacy of an unverified and unverifiable hypothesis such as God of any book is myopic." (link) The fundamental assumption here is that God, as an unverified and unverifiable hypothesis, is only known through the experience of an individual. Thus this is a statement that God is known through epistemological idealism. Because "God" is a personal thing, it is not something that can be transfered from person to person, and hence is "unverifiable", i.e. not objective. This viewpoint is actually fairly common among believers (or the faithful). As one grad student I know once told me, his experience with God was a personal experience that he had had and readily recognized that he could no more prove his belief and knowledge of God to another person than he could prove the existence of his own thoughts.

One of the results of this way of thinking is that when confronted with the dilemma of having God known through idealism, but science largely through realism, the standard response is to say that there are limits to knowledge through epistemological realism and that the knowledge of that which pertains to God is of a different realm or level. Thus the statement, "How do we describe our “limits of knowledge”? By beliefs!" (link) This expresses the idea that all that can be known through epistemological realism (i.e. science in general) is limited in some way and when we reach that limit we declare that then begins our faith, and we move into the realm of epistemological idealism.

The main criticism of this approach is that "religious "apologists" ... frame a "hypothetical" god in such a way to render it unprovable by modern methods." (link) Because the belief in God retreats into the realm of epistemological  idealism, it is assumed that "God" has become unverifiable and unprovable, and many people of faith will admit this. Those that find this approach towards God to be unacceptable insist that "the existence of god is a question that can, in principle, be answered scientifically." (link) This statement is an assertion that all things, God included, are subject to epistemological realism and must therefore satisfy the demands of an objective reality.

The difficulty here is that the usual approach of Christianity is to use Platonic rationalism. So while Christian theologians and apologists (here the term apologist is a very apt term, because (quoting Wikipedia) "Apologetics (from Greek απολογία, "speaking in defense") is the discipline of defending a position (usually religious) through the systematic use of reason.") such as C. S. Lewis, St. Augustine and many others are very good at rationally explaining their faith, they are subject to all the debates and problems of Platonic philosophy.

Previously I mentioned that when believers reach the limit of epistemological realism they then move into epistemological idealism and make God a subjective reality. But for those of us who stay firmly rooted in epistemological realism and insist on God being an objective reality, we run into the problem of the limits of Platonic rationalism and this usually prompts statements like this, "I admittedly can *never* prove [God] exists as much as give reasons to believe He is a viable option." (link) This is a classic example of recognizing the limits of Platonic rationalism, while still insisting on an epistemological realism in regards to God. Thus, by saying this Joe is keeping within the realm of realism without reverting to a idealist argument. The reason why statements like this are still scientifically consistent (i.e. still epistemologically realist) is because of things like Gödel's incompleteness theorem, and Wittgenstein's private language argument. These arguments are summed up in statements like this, "The Venn diagram of *true* things is larger than the Venn diagram of things that can be proven or refuted using science." and "A worldview restricted only to science is limiting." (link). This particular approach still relies on the "different realms" argument for science and theology, but insists on God being objective, even if He falls outside the realms of logic.

To sum up, I find that most common explanations and arguments about God assume that He falls within the realm of epistemological idealism as a personal experience, which results in the criticism that God is unverifiable and unprovable because He is a subjective experience. Which leads to the assertion that belief and faith are a private thing and must be kept private. Hence the statement, "Here is the crux of the problem: Priest can pray to his heart content; he can not ask others to join him, if he wants to be a scientist." (link) Because faith is a private (subjective, idealistic) thing then to insist that others share the same experience (be objective about it) is rightly thought of as a logical inconsistency (hence the, "So he is a oxymoron.").

But for those of us who consider God to be within the realm of epistemological realism, then it is not logically inconsistent to be a religious scientist. The debate then moves into the realm of whether or not it is rational to believe in God as an objective reality. The common criticisms at this point are either a rational (philosophical) attempt to disprove the existence of God (a number of serious arguments against God are of this type. See, Ayn Rand, Nietzsche, Dawkins and other well known atheists), or rely on a more agnostic argument insisting that they have never had an experience with God and therefore cannot rationally accept His existence, which I admit makes perfect sense.

I hope this explanation helps the conversation and gives us a basis for discussion. I also hope that those that read this can see how this seemingly highfalutin explanation actually relates to everyday things. While the point of this post was not to convince anyone one way or the other, I hope it will help people have a better grasp on what is going on and understand why people respond the way they do.

Keep in mind that many people use a combination of realism and idealism in their lives and in how they understand the world and do not strictly hold to one or the other. Also, even for the realists they use a combination of rationalism and empiricism, and usually do not take the time to set a clear distinction. Thus it is a rare thing that all these ideas can be brought together in a single conversation, which is why I took the time to point them out and write this post.

For those that are interested in my own personal views: I am a epistemological realist of the Aristotelian empiricism persuasion. This means that I firmly know that God can be known objectively, but that logical or rational arguments are insufficient (but not useless) in communicating knowledge about God. This means that knowledge of God must first be gained independently and personally, but after that knowledge is gained it is subject to the system of objective checks and balances, meaning before I can claim experience with God in a rational way, it must be independently verified by the personal experiences of others. This verification happens through a rational, logical discourse, which of necessity cannot happen until those involved have had similar experiences on which to base their conversation. This does not mean a conversation cannot take place, but full knowledge will only come through personal experience.

How Much Should Scientists Extrapolate The Known To The Unknown?

We know an awful lot about the observable universe in the "low-energy" regime and a question that bugs my mind is: how much should we extrapolate what we know about the universe to regions we technically don't know much about? Three recent events have made me think about this:

1. Dr. Kolb and Turner, who probably gave the most enjoyable talks at the AAS Meeting, bristled at the idea that many cosmologists are convinced we live in a multiverse from extrapolating what we know about the observable universe and went into outright mockery of string theorists who have dreamed up branes, landscapes, etc... by doing the same thing.
2. Sean Carrol, who recently polled readers of how likely inflation was, suggested one of the reasons he only gives inflation a 75% chance of being real is that it involves energy scales that we know nothing about. (But in fairness to inflation, this leads to predictions that are verified so you can't put in in the same category as something like string theory. :))
3. Jonathan recently asked if it was fair to say the universe is flat globally if we only have data showing flatness "locally".  

Now, first of all I think there is one very good reason to extrapolate: It's the best we can do given what we know now!

But I guess one question that bothers me is: How much confidence should we put in our extrapolation of known physics to the unknown?

I will give you an overly simplistic example just to make sure we are on the same page.  What if we were living in a one dimensional world and this was our observable universe:

Now, what would we, living at that red dot, conclude about the whole universe from extrapolation?  Probably that we live on a sine wave.  And from x between -6 and 6 that assumption would seem to work very well.

But what if it turns out this was our universe:

As we see here, our assumptions based on extrapolation would be wrong.

Now many of you will think this is childish, but is it?

For example: there was a day when humans had good reasons to believe the earth was flat.  They extrapolated... and they were wrong.  There were others who had good evidence that the sun and stars orbited around the earth.  They extrapolated... and they were wrong.  There were others who had experimental reasons to think gravity can effect all other matter instantaneously. (Action at a distance)  They extrapolated... and they were wrong. Etc...

And so I wonder how likely we are to be falling into the same trap as our ancestors?  On one hand extrapolation is all, and is the most honest thing, we can do.  But on the other, history has had a way of punishing the extrapolaters.  

One should be said though: once new data does come demonstrating our cherished "extrapolated" theories are wrong, eventually the mainstream science community drops them and moves on.  History has shown that eventually mainstream science will lead toward the right answer as more data comes in on the matter.

So what do you think?  How much confidence should we scientists put in our "theories from extrapolation"?

String Theory Is False If There Are No Gravitons.

Is it possible to falsify string theory?  Luboš Motl has just listed a few ways to do so. Though I think some are too impractical to be helpful, I think it is important for string theorists to try to find legitimate was to falsify the theory so that we don't have some Russell's Teapot theory on our hands. IE... a theory that may be false but one that you can never really know.

That said, I would like to highlight one that may be semi-practical: (From Zwiebach linked to the right.)

String theorists sometimes say that string theory has already made at least one successful prediction: it predicted gravity!

But actually I think the prediction string theory makes is that gravity is mediated by a spin-2 particle called the graviton. Therefore, if there are no gravitons then string theory is false.

Now, why am I claiming this may be semi-practical? Because in principle we can construct theories where gravity is meditated by something other than a spin-2 particle. One example, which I admit is probably garbage, is that gravity could be just a consequence of entropy as proposed by Eric Verlinde. And there are and will continue to be even more non-graviton theories proposed until a graviton is discovered.

Now, if one of these alternative-to-the-spin2-graviton theories are ever experimentally verified... I guess we will have done more then disprove the existence of a spin-2 graviton.... We will have also disproven string theory at the same time!

In the meantime, my money is still on gravity being mediated by a graviton as that is the most reasonable thing to believe.

Is The Idea Of An Enlightenment Dead?

Chris Mooney, a blogger over at The Intersection, gave an interesting 5 minute discussion where he despairs that the idea of an enlightenment may be as good as dead.  Why?  Let's read some quotes: (Or you can watch above yourself, between the 15 and 20 minute marks)

First: smart people are good at defending their preconceived notions:

We all think that, the longer you've been in school the more you've learned, you become more scientific in your thinking. You become more rational. 

NO! It doesn't work like that. In fact, the smarter you are the better you are at gathering information that agrees with with what you already wanted to believe anyways. And the better you are at arguing your point, the better you are at confirming your biases. In fact when arguments come at you, you've already got a armada of counter arguments. 

Unfortunately this is all too true.  In fact, we just posted on a poll that seem to suggest the more educated you are the more likely you are to side with your political parties views on climate change.  (And Chris discusses this very thing in the video.)

So: if you want someone to accept climate change, or any other issue that runs against someones world view, educating them further does not seem to mean they will be more likely to accept it!

Second: Many hoped that things like TV or the Internet will finally unite society, making us less ignorant of the world and therefore more likely to make correct decisions.  Unfortunately, this optimistic idea has failed and the media seems to only compounds the problem:

You have to throw human nature with the modern media system... The Internet came along fractionating the audience even further into self selecting the little pockets of information and their going for the stuff that they already agree with. So this confirmation bias, this sense that we're going to reaffirm ourselves, now we've got media that purposely allows us to do it.  

And so it is.

If you are right leaning there are websites and a dedicated 24 hour cable news network for you.  If you are left leaning you've got the same options from cable and the web.  If you are an atheist you have blogs like Pharyngula where you can find hundreds of other people to help reassure you that you are correct and people who are not atheists must be idiots. If you are religious... and so it goes.

On one hand smart people are great at gathering information and putting together clever arguments and on the other we have a well structured media system to assist them in their efforts.

And so Chris concludes:

We have to give up on frankly, the enlightenment.... central to the enlightenment... is this idea that truth triumphs, everybody becomes a better critical thinker. and society advances and we become more reasoned we become more knowledgeable... it's not like that.

Unfortunately, I fear he is correct.  Ultimately, the talent of being smart and resourceful mixed with the ease of finding whatever you want from the modern media will probably kill the idea of a society that converges on "truth" (whatever that means) and thus will kill the idea of an enlightenment.

Thoughts?

(Oh and Happy New Years!)

The Atheist's Catch-22. (Or the Ultimate Coincidence Problem.)

                                        Image via Wikipedia

Let's assume, for sake of argument, that the universe is ultimately meaningless, without purpose and has no reason to care or cater to the needs of rational beings.  People who believe this I will refer to as atheists.

I find atheists to be in an interesting predicament since I'm sure only one of two things are possible:

1. There is a theory of everything. (In the scientific sense.)

In this case, even though there is no reason a meaningless universe should be set-up just right to be understood by rational beings inside and out, this just happens to be the case. (Oh how wonderfully convenient for us! :))  Or as Einstein famously said:

"The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it's comprehensible" 

Einstein was right, and this is the ultimate coincidence problem.  In physics, coincidence problems are ones where we find that, for whatever reason, we exist in a special situation in the universe.  One that just happens to be suited for our needs.  Physicists don't like these and so they are considered problems.

Well, then why do we find ourselves coincidentally in a meaningless universe that just happens to be so well suited for rational beings to understand inside and out?   Why is it so well suited to be understood completely through man-made constructs we call scientific theories?

2. There is not a theory of everything. (In the scientific sense.)

In this case science cannot explain everything in the universe.  People, like Hawking, trying to understand how the universe works fundamentally using science alone are doing so in vein. (And I am 100% pro-science, but if it cannot explain everything I have to admit it becomes limited in scope.)

People refer to problems with "god of the gaps" arguments with the assumption that all gaps will one day be closed by science.  However, if there is not a theory of everything (in the scientific sense) then there will always be a gap a mile wide! (I'm not saying God necessarily goes there, only that the gap exists.)  And since the gap is real, as the universe is real and science cannot explain all of it, this means something beyond science, or something that transcends science, is ultimately required to have a full understanding of our universe.

3. What I don't want to hear:

A. "This is just and attempt to prove Christianity."  I've said nothing of Christianity.  This coincidence problem would be independent of what religions, if any, walked the earth.  Don't try to sneak around the problem by attacking religion. That would be a strawman argument.

B. "You have abused the meaning of Catch-22, this isn't technically what the word means."  I realize this.    This is a blog not a dictionary and I chose the word that for whatever reason I enjoyed the best.

C. "What are you trying to prove?"  That being an atheist, you find yourself in an interesting predicament.  On one hand the universe is devoid of meaning and yet it just happens to be "set up" for rational beings to understand inside and out. (Again, how wonderfully convenient for us humans! :)) And on the other, if it cannot be understood inside and out using rational thought than using science to understand the whole universe on a fundamental level is pointless, and there will always be a "gap a mile wide" that something beyond or transcending science must fill. (Again, I did not say it is the Christian God... I did not say what it was except it is something beyond/transcending science.)

Ultimately, I am just trying to echo Einstein saying "The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it's comprehensible" and find it odd that atheists are not equally perplexed by all this as much as he was.

Schrödinger's Cat: A Semi-Classical Mistake

I'm sure that anyone who is reading this blog has heard of Schrödinger's Cat and can at least give a brief synopsis of the famous thought experiment. So I will not do that here, but I will discuss some of the implications and misconceptions about Schrödinger's Cat (if you are not familiar with it then read then you can read more here). For my part I have heard Schrödinger's Cat explained in classes on quantum mechanics many many times. The most recent being my graduate quantum class, and previously from my physics classes at BYU. In ALL of these explanations the general approach is to tell the thought experiment (with a few variations) and then finish up by proclaiming "Therefore the cat is both alive and dead, AT THE SAME TIME!!!"

Occasionally the effort is made to point out that Schrödinger was trying to show how ridiculous the Copenhagen interpretation is but this explanation is always half-hearted and does not really consider the problem fully. Mostly it is treated as a brain teaser without any attempt to actually answer the questions involved, or to draw any significant physical conclusions. This stands in stark contrast to other famous thought experiments that fundamentally changed the way we view the world. The problem with this is that Schrödinger's Cat is one of the few parts of physics where the technical, philosophical conversation diverged from what is taught in standard physics classes to the point that most physicists are not even aware that the paradox posed by Schrödinger has been answered and resolved.

To give you an idea of what I mean I will use an analogy. In the beginning of the last century people were starting to wonder about the nature of the universe, especially when it was found that one of the implications of general relativity was that, without at least a corrective term, the universe would be expanding. This was backed up by Hubble's observations. Over the years the nature of the expanding universe has been debated, calculated, recalculated, considered, proved, disproved, reproved, recalculated, recalibrate, observed, reobserved and recalculated. The point is the conversation has moved on significantly from the beginning of the 1900's, and the issues involved have grown and have become more complex.

Now imagine sitting in on an astronomy class and the professor says something to the effect, "It is possible that the universe is expanding. There are some theories that say that the stars, galaxies and everything else are moving away from each other, but when we look out into the night sky we don't actually observe anything moving. All the stars are just fixed and immovable, so these theories present a paradox, because how can the universe be expanding if we don't see it moving?"

Assuming that this professor is not trying to make the students think critically and eventually learn how to reconcile observations with theories, most of us would be wondering how in the world this guy got his job in the first place. If the professor asked this question and left it like that without ever trying to explain to the students the changes and advancements in our understanding over the last 100 years then we should be concerned about the level of education that these students were receiving.

Several years ago that may have been a valid question, but the scientific conversation has moved on since then as our understanding has changed to accommodate our new understanding, and what is taught in basic physics and astronomy classes has also changed to reflect this. Unfortunately the same has not happened with Schrödinger's Cat. The way it is presented in physics classes is the same way it has always been approached, and that approach does not reflect the shift in the physical or philosophical conversation over that last 70-80 years. Essentially physics teachers are still talking about Schrödinger's Cat like a paradox when there is none.

One of the main problems lies with the strict Copenhagen interpretation. The Copenhagen interpretation asserts that before a measurement is made the system exists simultaneously in all possible states (i.e. the cat is both alive and dead, or the particle is in both energy states 1 and 2). The problem with this is that a statement such as, "The cat is alive", fundamentally assumes that an observation has already been made. But no observation has been made. Insisting that the cat is either alive or dead or both before an observation is made fundamentally misunderstands what it means to be alive or dead. It would be like asking the question, "What is the mass of a certain rock on the far side of the moon?". It is a valid question and there are upper and lower bounds to what the mass might be but to insist that the mass of the rock is a simultaneous superposition of all possible masses does not make sense. Essentially the problem with saying that the particle (cat) exists in all possible states is that we would be insisting on knowing something that we do not know.

So when someone says, "The cat is both alive and dead at the same time." then they are effectively saying, "There exists some knowledge that I do not have, and that falls outside the realm of knowledge altogether, but I will now make a definitive statement about that thing and what it is, even though I do not know." In other words, "I know something that I do not know."

When put like this the paradox seems rather ridiculous. But to be fair to the original issue I will mention that both Schrödinger's Cat and the Copenhagen interpretation were trying to address a very interesting issue that presented itself with the advent of modern quantum mechanics. Under a classical consideration everything was self-existent with a definite state, but one of the conclusions of quantum mechanics was that nothing had a definite state until it was observed. This seemed to fly in the face of how we understood the world to work because originally the state of a particle (or anything for that matter) was inextricably linked to its existence. So, classically, it did not make sense to have a particle not be in a specific state, because that would imply that, at least until it was observed, it did not exist. The chain of logic can be characterized in the following syllogism:

All things that exist have a definite state and all things that have a definite state, by definition, exist. Quantum mechanics tells us that before an observation is made a particle is not in one specific state but exists in a range of possibilities. But in order for the particle to exist it must be in some state, so in order to preserve the existence of the particle we must assert that it exists in all possible states at the same time.

This particular syllogism leads to the conclusion that Schrödinger's Cat is both alive and dead at the same time, which is absurd, and it was this point that Schrödinger wished to make with his thought experiment. The original argument used by Schrödinger (and Einstein) dealt with the last statement in the syllogism which is the conclusion that the particle (cat) must exist in all possible states. While their argument may have been insightful it did not deal with the root of the problem, which comes from the original statement that in order for something to exist it must be in a specific state. Essentially the problem is that the original statement fundamentally assumes a classical view of the world and thus the conclusion, which is central to the Copenhagen interpretation, contains a mixture of both classical and modern views. You might call it a semi-classical view.

One way of thinking about this problem was expressed by Steven Weinberg.

"Bohr's version of quantum mechanics was deeply flawed, but not for the reason Einstein thought. The Copenhagen interpretation describes what happens when an observer makes a measurement, but the observer and the act of measurement are themselves treated classically. This is surely wrong: Physicists and their apparatus must be governed by the same quantum mechanical rules that govern everything else in the universe."

Essentially we cannot mix classical views with modern views. We must think of everything acting quantum mechanically, which means that we cannot assert that existence is determined by being in a particular state. If we take this approach then it completely removes the paradox presented by Schrödinger's Cat and the Copenhagen interpretation (but not the math, or the probabilities given by it!).

Platonic vs. Aristotelian World Views

[Editorial Note: Sorry I did not post this sooner, but I have been busy and I have also been thinking about this for a few weeks. But several people have asked what I meant by Platonic and Aristotelian world views. This is an attempt at an explanation.]

Previously I posted on the "conflict" between science and religion. A critical distinction that I made in that post was the difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian world views. At the time I did not offer an in depth explanation of what constituted a Platonic or Aristotelian world view partly because they are rather difficult (i.e. would take several books) to explain. But not to leave those who are interested with absolutely no explanation I will attempt to give a brief explanation of the fundamentals of both. [Editorial Note: When I am giving an explanation I will often include another word in parentheses after a word which has a technical philosophical definition. The word in parentheses is a more colloquial (common) word used in the same context. Both words are interchangeable but I felt that more than one word was needed to get an idea across while still using the "correct" philosophical language (words). If you find it annoying, sorry. I can't think of a better way of doing it.]

On a basic level a Platonic world view carries with it a fundamental distrust of the material (observable) world. An Aristotelian world view fundamentally assumes that all knowledge comes from the observable world (universe). Note that these ideas are not opposite nor are they even mutually exclusive. But they are two approaches to the same thing, how we know and interact with the world.

In my previous post I implied that the Platonic world view was the root of many problems, and while it is, I should qualify that with an explanation. If not considered rightly a Platonic world view can lead to many philosophical (intellectual) problems. By way of explanation I will use a simple analogy, specifically tailored to my assumed audience, those who read this blog. This analogy will not work for everyone.

When we are first learning physics the standard approach is to learn physics with a heavy emphasis on the algebra involved. This means that the equations are given to us in a standard form, from which we work problems and (hopefully) come to an understanding of the physical principles involved. When we have passed this step and we have achieved a certain level of understanding, generally one then returns to the basic physical principles, and relearns them but now with an emphasis on deriving the equations and solving more complex problems using calculus instead of algebra. This allows us to solve problems and answer questions that were impossible before. Problems such as including wind resistance in projectile motion problems. The underlying physical principles have not changed, just our approach to the problem.

This different approach fundamentally assumes that the world is not as "simple" and "easy" to deal with as is usually presented in introductory physics classes (i.e. the world is not made up of spherical cows). While things may be more difficult, and require more training and experience, the outcome allows more understanding and insight.

For all simple cases there is no difference between an algebra based approached to physics and a calculus based approach. As a matter of fact if we tried to solve every basic physics problem by first writing down the Lagrangian for the system and then finding the equations of motion we would never have time to finish solving all of the simplest problems. So in some cases it may even be advantageous to use an algebra based approach than to use a calculus based approach. But if we do this we must realize that we are using a simplification and to not get bogged down in the potential shortcomings of the purely algebra based approach.

Now relating this back to the Platonic and Aristotelian world views, the Platonic approach recognizes that the world is very messy and is not "ideal", meaning that it cannot easily be reduced down to simple, easily solvable problems. There is no problem with this, as this is also the view taken by an Aristotelian world view. But the problem arises when someone who holds to a Platonic world view begins to think that the universe is actually made up of spherical cows (i.e. atoms are "hard" and perfectly spherical, all things can be considered to be point particles, forces behave exactly like 1/r^2 laws etc.). So the problem is not that spherical cows (simplifications) are used to solve (comprehend) problems (reality) but when we begin to actually think that the universe is made up of spherical cows (ideal, according to our understanding) we run in to intellectual (philosophical) problems (mistakes).

You may be thinking, "What in the world is he talking about? How does this relate to anything important? And does this have any bearing on how the world, and our society works?" Well to answer those questions let me give a few examples.

First, recently there was a post on this blog that included this comic:


Without knowing it (or maybe he did) by posting this comic Joe was showcasing the Platonic world view (and one of the problems with it). Essentially the XKCD comic expresses the idea that the further away from reality we move, the more "ideal" or "pure" we are getting. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that in order to understand the world we must move away from all the "messy" stuff and move in the the realm of pure thought. Only then can we begin to understand anything. It is interesting to note that in seven short comments attached to that post the Platonic world view was debated, debunked and rejected in favor of the Aristotelian world view (and Clark Goble even managed to include both Heidegger's and Wittgenstein's arguments against the Platonic nature of language, impressive. And Bill, John Locke and John Stuart Mill would be proud, though many philosophers would try to lynch you for it).

So other than comics where does any of this show up? Again I need to emphasise that the basis for the Platonic world view is a fundamental distrust of reality (observation, sensations). This fundamental distrust of reality leads to all kinds of weird wacky things, like this gem that my wife came across one day. On a basic level the Platonic (or Platonic like) world view leads people to assume that in order to learn anything "real" or of value, they must disassociate themselves with reality (the physical world). This was the motivation behind the drive to use "experimental drugs", such as LSD, in order to experience things that could not be "experienced" in the physical world (this was explained to me by a philosophy student who "had friends that did drugs").

There are other implications to this but to sum up it, is enough to say that even though the Platonic and Aristotelian approaches to the world both consider the physical world to be "messy" at first, the Platonic approach feels that the "messiness" prevents the discovery of the world and thus in the ideal case we must remove the influences of all the "messy" stuff from reality, including our senses and anything that has to do with our "physical" bodies. The Aristotelian approach recognizes that the world is difficult, and while simplifications (math, equations, words, language) can be used to make it easier, the simplifications are just that, a simplification and not an ideal. Thus a Platonic approach demands that new knowledge comes from the ideal world (Plato's world of Forms), while on the other hand the Aristotelian approach assumes that knowledge comes from observation (sensation) of the physical world, and is verified again by observation. All knowledge according to the Platonic approach, by definition, is not verifiable in the Aristotelian sense, but is entirely determined by whether or not one can "think correctly" about it.

So how does this relate to the original motivation for this post involving the "conflict" between science and religion? On a fundamental level science takes an Aristotelian approach to how we learn and find out things about the universe. It asks, "What do we observe and how can we explain what we observe?" While science (and physics in particular) takes an Aristotelian approach, it is not exclusive. We still see a substantial amount of Platonic thought in science, but it is not as common as it is in other fields of research (Math is one that is substantially Platonic).

Perhaps the most prominent place Platonic thought shows up is in religion. I should emphasize that there is nothing about religion that demands Platonic thought, but at times it does seem rather conducive to Platonic thought as it mostly deals with things that are not (obviously) related to the five senses (I put the "obviously" in there because I disagree with that assertion). But if we are working under a Platonic world view then it makes sense that if one considers the mental or the abstract (the Platonic Forms) to be the most pure and perfect then that is where one would consider their God to be. This leads to the argument that God does not partake of the physical world and does not have any part in it other than being the unmoved mover (important note, there is an important distinction here between having an unmoved mover, as was Aristotle's concept, and thinking of God as the unmoved mover). In the end religion (and other "intellectual" fields, such as philosophy and math) became dominated by Platonic thought, while Aristotelian thought dominated science. Again this was not an exclusive domination (nor even correct) but that is the way it stands today in our society.

This causes problems when the question is asked, "Can you prove that God exists?" A Platonist would respond with a philosophical argument for the existence of God, an Aristotelian would respond with a demonstration of the existence of God. In the first case scientists (who are largely Aristotelian in their approach to knowledge) would reject the arguments as invalid because in order to "prove" anything according to science it must be demonstrated (mathematical proof does not count, it has to be demonstrated by experiment, see string theory). Thus the requirements for "proof" are fundamentally different for the Platonic approach and the Aristotelian approach, and because 80-90% of religion takes a Platonic approach, the tendency of scientists is to reject religion as invalid. Unfortunately this rejection first assumes that religion is fundamentally Platonic, and that any approach to it must first be Platonic (including a "scientific" approach).

This difficulty goes away if an Aristotelian approach is taken with respect to both science and religion. In other words it must be assumed that the same modes of knowing can be used for both, which depending on your views of religion (or science, or both) may be an issue. But if the same method is used for both then all apparent difficulties go away (interesting note: it works both ways, if a Platonic approach is taken in both cases then there is no conflict, but as long as a different approach is taken for either science or religion then there will be a conflict).

So now after this long explanation I will return to what I started out by saying:

On a basic level a Platonic world view carries with it a fundamental distrust of the material (observable) world. An Aristotelian world view fundamentally assumes that all knowledge comes from the observable world (universe). Note that these ideas are not opposite nor are they even mutually exclusive. But they are two approaches to the same thing, how we know and interact with the world.

The problem comes when we take the Platonic distrust of the material world to the point that we think that the material world inhibits our understanding. This is in opposition to the Aristotelian view, which is that even though the observable world may be difficult to understand it is the basis of our knowledge and our understanding and we cannot reject it as the fundamental source of knowledge.

Are Physical Theories Just Models?

Look at the figure to the right.  There is a physical world which we observe.  From these observations we derive physical laws.  (Usually expressed in mathematical statements).  A question arises: Is the universe really obeying these laws or did we just get lucky in finding something that models the behavior we observe? 

Moreover, can we ever know?

Here is a similar thought by Peter Szekeres:

When we consider the significant achievements of mathematical physics, one can not help but wonder why the workings of the universe are expressible at all by rigid mathematical 'laws'. Furthermore, how is it that purely human constructs refined over centuries of thought, have any relevance at all?... Some of these questions and challenges may be fundamentally unanswerable, but the fact remains that mathematics seems to be the correct path to understanding the physical world.

Though the above is philosophical, I think it is still worth pondering. 

To Me It's Okay Because The Models Have Predictive Power.

Even if physical theories are no more than models, I still find the pursuit of science very valuable because of its predictive power.  Models or not, modern scientific theories predict masses, velocities, positions, charges...  From these predictions we can create electronics, build cities, cure diseases, etc...

Science therefore does not suffer from the same thing that plagues many other philosophical constructs. For example, from Steven Weinberg:

Why was Aristotle... satisfied with a theory of motion that did not provide any way of predicting where a projectile or other falling body would be at any moment during its flight...? According to Aristotle, substances tend to move to their natural positions... but Aristotle did not try to say how fast a bit of earth drops downward or a spark flies upward. I am not asking why Aristotle had not discovered Newton's laws... 

What puzzles me is why Aristotle expressed no dissatisfaction that he had not learned how to calculate the positions of projectiles at each moment along their paths. He did not seem to realize that this was a problem that anyone ought to solve. 

Even if physical theories are only models of reality, with modern science we have real predictive power so Aristotle's problem no longer exists and I believe this is a wonderful thing.

The Big Bang, Culture And Our Unique Place In Time.

Lawrence Krauss submitted a paper that is short and should be assessable to all our readers named The Big Bang, Modern Cosmology and the Fate of the Universe: Impacts upon Culture.

The paper raises some interesting ideas.  I will go through some:

1. The question "where did we come from" has been as fundamental in shaping our culture as anything else.  How will our expanding knowledge of the physics behind our origins effect this?

Ever since humans have had the capacity to wonder, they have been inspired by the night sky to wonder about questions such as: Where did we come from?, or, Are we Alone?, or How will the Universe end? These questions and others form the very basis of much of human culture, beginning with myths and religion, and moving, over the past 400 years into the domain of modern science...

Eighty five years ago our universe consisted of a single galaxy, our Milky Way. Now we know there are over 400 billion galaxies in the observable universe! More remarkable still, almost all people now take for granted the fact that our universe had a beginning which occurred a finite time ago... The Big Bang changed everything.

 2. Modern cosmology sometimes hints that the anthropic principle may be right after all.  There may not be a fundamental principle forcing our universe to be as it is.  It could be universes are quantum mechanically generated over and over until finally one with life emerges.

In some sense this spells the end for science as we know it:

As appealing as this [anthropic principle] may seem on the surface, it is rife with problems... If anthropic arguments are correct (while we may never be able to falsify them), it suggests that science as we have known it for the past 400 years is, at a fundamental level, over. The march of physics has constantly been aimed at showing that the universe must be the way it is, based on fundamental principles. If anthropic arguments are correct, physics becomes, at a fundamental level merely an environmental science.

3.  One thing really bizarre is that we are living in one of the only periods in the universe's history where we could ever "see" the Big Bang happened.  Why do we live in such a special time, perhaps the only time in history when we could even know about the Big Bang?

In particular we find that in a time comparable to the age of the longest lived stars all evidence that the Big Bang will disappear–observers will not be able to perform any observation or experiment that infers either the existence of an expanding universe dominated by a cosmological constant, or that there was a hot Big Bang.

Krauss then ends like this:

We appear to live in a very special time: the only time when we can observationally verify that we live at a very special time! Of course, however, it is likely that all observers at all times may feel this is the case... Perhaps observations made in the far future will reveal aspects of the universe we cannot yet measure that will change the current, strange model we have uncovered for the cosmos, or that will reveal aspects of dark energy that we cannot now even imagine.

The last century has clearly changed our understanding of the place of humanity, and the earth, within the cosmos. The revolutions of the past several decades have changed everything about our understanding of the future. Will these revolutions change our cultural perspective in a way that changes behavior?

Any thoughts?

Should Access to Healthcare Be a Universal Right?

Unless you've been under a rock for the past 6 months you are aware that the US is engaged in a debate over the future of healthcare for Americans. There are many important issues to be addressed, but I am most fascinated by what I see as the fundamental philosophical question: Should access to healthcare be a universal right? As I see it, the healthcare debate is an argument between two fundamental rights. From the Declaration of Independence:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, and that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."

On one side, there is a compelling argument that the inalienable right to life comes first for a reason. Without life, there is no liberty or happiness to pursue. Healthcare is already a collective effort - anyone can walk into an emergency room and be treated independent of their ability to pay - and research has shown that in systems like those in Canada, Britain, and France the overall mortality rate is lower than in the US and for less cost, so why not embrace a single-payer (or pseudo-single-payer, which is really what a public-option is) system? It will allow more Americans access to life. (Check out this argument in the New York Times.)

On the other side, there is an equally compelling argument that the rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness are compromised by government run or mandated healthcare. The current American system does a better job of providing the best healthcare for those who do have insurance - why should that opportunity be taken away? Shouldn't I have the liberty to choose my coverage or lack thereof? The more the government interferes with healthcare the more it restricts the freedom of doctors and patients. Private healthcare provides more liberty. (Check out this argument in the Wall Street Journal.)

So which one will win? I don't know. To be honest, I'm not even sure which one I'm rooting for. I like life and I like liberty. The trick, as always, is finding the optimal balance between the two.

The Principle of Peer Review

The recent posts by Joe discussing some of the major ideas of science got me thinking, so I decided to wade in on the conversation and add a few things that Joe may not mention. I apologize if this is a little long, but I was trained as a philosopher so I may tend to be wordy.

For many people their only connection or exposure to science comes from a high school science class (or college), or from science centered magazines such as Scientific American or Popular Science. For some people their only exposure to science and scientists in general comes from Hollywood or TV (shudder). For all those who don't have personal experience with scientific research there are a few critical things that never seem to get mentioned in any of these outlets. One of those critical ideas is the principle of peer review.

Peer review is something so fundamental to science that often scientists themselves forget to mention it when explaining what they do to non-scientists, much in the same way a congressman would not think about explaining the fundamentals democracy if someone asked him to explain what he does in his job. This comparison to a politician is apt and I will use it later on, but first let me dispel some misconceptions. The other day I was watching a TV show and as part of the story a "scientist" came and informed the people in a small town that they would have to move because their presence was threatening the local wildlife. As proof of her claim the "scientist" presented her "data" in the form of her doctoral dissertation, which was just a stack of paper in a clear plastic binder. Through out the episode several characters keep referring to the "data" and how it "speaks for itself". Each time someone said something like that my skin began to crawl. Also through out the episode the "scientist" continues to assert that she is right because she has "the data" and she is a "scientist" (it turns out she was wrong, but anyway...). At about that point in the show I about collapsed on the floor in agony.

While scientists do tend to deal with data, the stereotypical scientist that we see in movies or on TV is so far from the truth that for those of us who actually are scientists it can be almost physically painful to watch. One of the things that made the TV show that I mentioned so bad was its complete disregard and ignorance of the concept of peer review, which is something so absolutely fundamental to science that without it science appears no more rational than horoscopes and astrology. To put the concept of peer review in proper perspective I will use an analogy to something we are all familiar with, government.

To put it simply peer review is like holding an election. When a scientist does work they study different phenomena and come up with ideas that explain what they observe. A critical part of the whole process is where the scientists take what they have learned and write it down and present it to others. This point of the process is like a politician campaigning for office, they need the approval of their peers in order to determine the future course of events, or public policy. At this point what the scientist has written is put to intense scrutiny and compared to previous published (peer reviewed) work and the personal experience and expertise of the reviewers. If (IF) what the scientist has written passes peer review then it goes on to be published. In a democracy the only person that gets to hold office is the one that actually gets elected. It is the same with science, the only articles that get publish and are then considered valid science are those that pass peer review. To insist that something is scientifically sound before it passes peer review would be like a politician insisting on moving into his office even before the election.

Once something has passed peer review and gets published, it does not automatically guarantee that it is scientifically sound. We don't declare a politician to be successful before they actually serve their term (despite the opinions of some people). The success of a paper or scientific principle is measured by how influential it is, and whether or not others can duplicate its results. This can be roughly measured by the number of times a paper is cited in other published papers. A large number of citations may indicate a successful paper and good science.

In the case of the TV show I mentioned at the beginning, one reason why its depiction of science was so bad was that the scientist made no mention of her paper being published, peer reviewed and backed up by additional work, all of which are necessary for something to be considered scientifically sound. The character's assertion that she was right because she was a "scientist" is kind of like a politician insisting that they are a democratically elected official because they were appointed by a king. It doesn't make sense and completely undermines the whole concept of democracy, or science as the case may be.

I wish to point out that the principle of peer review is not just a social convention that we use to conduct science. Peer review is useful in preventing bad science, and also in providing a mechanism to construct a useful scientific dialogue, but the reason for it is more fundamental than that. Peer review is an expression of one of the fundamental aspects of the philosophy of science. One of the fundamental driving forces behind science is the concept that everything we observe is independent of the observer. What this means is that if one person observes something then someone else should (or must) be able to observe the same thing. If not then it can not be considered scientific. Another way of putting it is that no one is a privileged observer that has access to knowledge and data that no one else does. This comes from a belief that the universe will always act in a consistent manner and that it does not arbitrarily change the fundamental laws of existence for any one person.

In this sense the principle of peer review is an expression of the fundamental belief that the universe is rational, consistent and does not give special status to any one person. Thus no one can be right because they are a "scientist" (or a preacher, or a teacher, or a politician, or a philosopher etc.), but they are "right" in as much as what they say is in line with reality. Because any one person can be mistaken in what they observe we provide a safe guard in the form of peer review. Thus the principle of peer review is both a statement about a scientists fundamental understanding of how the universe works and a check to make sure that the universe, and also we ourselves are honest and correct in what we have observed.